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ThE RE-InVEnTIOn Of AdOpTIOn LAw: A REfLEcTIOn
Traditions which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin 
and sometimes invented.1
 Just as a November Thanksgiving or a December Christmas tree are not age-old 
Puritan American customs but in historical terms were recently manufactured, the 
fields of children’s law in general and adoption law in particular have greatly changed 
over the last 150 years. What is generally accepted today was anathema only yesterday, 
as societal recognition of adoption by singles or transracial adoption demonstrates.
 A decade ago, lawyers and adoption professionals worked within a welcoming 
environment where international adoption appeared to be an accepted and growing 
method of family creation. The number of children adopted internationally into the 
United States had soared from around 7000 in 1990 to almost 20,000 in 2001.2 The 
countries sending children to the United States included nations with longstanding 
adoption programs, such as South Korea, and countries that had never been open to 
international adoption, such as Russia and China, both of which soared in popularity 
as a source for internationally adopted children in the United States. This 
transformation was mirrored abroad as potential adoptive parents from France, 
Spain, or Italy reached out to children in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa.
 While the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) of 
1989 may have contained less than a ringing endorsement of international adoption, 
the Hague Adoption Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption (“Hague Adoption Convention”), concluded in 
1993, and entered into force in 1995, provided an agreed-upon framework for 
international adoption, with rules for ensuring that international adoption takes place 
in accordance with “the best interests of the child,” giving due respect to “his or her 
fundamental rights as recognized in international law.”3 Better yet, the ratification 
and implementation of the Hague Adoption Convention superseded the UNCRC’s 
debatable stance on international adoption.4 Although the scope of the Hague 
1. Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in The Invention of Tradition 1, 1 (Eric 
Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983).
2. Total Adoptions to the United States, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Children’s Issues, http://
adoption.state.gov/news/total_chart.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
3. The Convention’s principle goals are as follows:
(a) to establish safeguards to ensure that intercountry adoptions take place in the best 
interests of the child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights as recognized in 
international law;
(b) to establish a system of co-operation amongst Contracting States to ensure that 
those safeguards are respected and thereby prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic 
in children;
(c) to secure the recognition in Contracting States of adoptions made in accordance 
with the Convention.
 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, concluded 
May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167 (entered into force May 1, 1995).
4. For the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) position on international 
adoption, see Richard Carlson, Seeking the Better Interests of Children with a New International Law of 
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Adoption Convention was limited because it only covered adoptions from one Hague 
Adoption Convention country to another, advocates in the international adoption 
community hoped that, within a short period of time, most nations would come 
under the Hague Adoption Convention umbrella. Faith in the importance of the 
Hague adoption system increased further when the United States enacted the Hague 
Adoption Convention through the Intercountry Adoption Act (IAA) of 2000,5 and 
began progressing down the road towards Hague Adoption Convention effectiveness, 
reached on April 1, 2008.6 The Hague Adoption Convention’s scaffold of protective 
laws built on the foundation of a central authority, initially a difficult sell in the 
United States, had been accepted; the Department of State, albeit reluctantly, had 
agreed to assume this role. Individual private sector adoption service providers, a 
component of international adoption unique to the United States among receiving 
countries, had become Hague accredited in a lengthy and seemingly transparent 
process.
 As we survey the legal and policy landscapes surrounding international adoption 
at the beginning of the second decade of this century, an altogether different picture 
emerges. The number of children adopted internationally has plummeted: U.S. 
statistics show that the high watermark of international adoption was reached in 
2004 (22,990) and then declined rapidly thereafter (in 2009 the total was 12,753).7 
Often as not it seems that Hague Adoption Convention enactment in various 
countries has become a pretext for drastically shrinking, if not virtually closing, 
international adoption programs.8 Moreover, the nature of children who are being 
adopted internationally has changed. Program after program now focuses on special 
needs or hard-to-place children as opposed to the as-young-as-possible Asian baby 
girls whose omnipresence in certain areas has become a media cliché.9
Adoption, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 733 (2010–11). For the primacy of the Hague Adoption Convention 
over the UNCRC, see Laura Kaufmann, Resolving Conflicts Between the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, Ctr. for Adoption Pol’y Stud., available 
at http://www.adoptionpolicy.org/pdf/hague.pdf.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 14901 (2006).
6. See, e.g., Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption Reflect Human Rights Principles: 
Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child with the Hague Convention on 
Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. Int’l L.J. 179 (2003).
7. Total Adoptions to the United States, supra note 2. Note that the statistics are for federal fiscal years that 
end on September 30. For example, 2009 statistics cover October 1, 2008 through September 30, 2009. 
Id.
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: The Child ’s Story, 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 333 
(2007). Professor Bartholet also has eloquently made this crucial point at the annual Adoption Policy 
Conference held by the Center for Adoption Policy and New York Law School on March 5, 2010. Video 
of all conference proceedings are available online. Adoption Policy Conferences, N.Y.L. Sch., http://www.
nyls.edu/centers/harlan_scholar_centers/justice_action_center/annual_conferences/adoption_
conference (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
9. International adoption from China (the largest sending country to the United States) is now around 
60% waiting children, defined as children with an identified medical need or over the age of six. This 
ratio continues to increase in direct proportion to the ever-increasing waiting time for a foreign couple 
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 If you believe, as the contributors to this volume clearly do (and as does this 
author), that international and domestic adoption are desirable and necessary methods 
of family creation for unparented children, two questions come to mind: What legal 
and policy considerations drastically altered the environment for international 
adoption, and what can we do, legally and politically, to change the dismal outlook 
for international adoption? Each of the authors included has her or his own response 
to these questions. It is my privilege to discuss these contributions that hopefully will 
move the discussion of international adoption from the played-out debates of the 
present to a new plane, which will enable laws to be reoriented so that the ability of 
all children to find permanent, loving homes can be legally sanctified and practically 
enhanced. The “tradition” of the twentieth century’s last decade can and should 
become the renewed tradition of the next decade.
I
 Professor Elizabeth Bartholet encompasses the spirit of this volume with her 
piece, Permanency Is Not Enough: Children Need the Nurturing Parents Found in 
International Adoption.10 Bartholet has literally written the books on adoption, both 
international and domestic. She has been something rarer than an accomplished 
teacher and author: she has been a public intellectual who continues to work for the 
right of children to have a permanent, loving family.11 Her work on the Multiethnic 
Placement Act12 contributed to a legislative second chance for children who, for 
reasons of race-matching, were relegated to a life of substandard care.
 Having recognized the crisis in international adoption, Bartholet insists that “we 
must maintain hope for the future.”13 Because the path of history is contingent, rather 
than fixed, we should work to revive international adoption, rather than write its 
obituary. Bartholet also recommends that international adoption proponents look for 
allies outside their usual comfort zone. Indeed, the track record of the Haitian 
Humanitarian Parole Program illustrates just how effective the U.S. government can 
be at helping children unite with their adoptive families when its officials so choose.
to adopt a non-special needs child from China. Currently it takes close to five years to bring home a 
non-special needs child from China, as opposed to under a year for a waiting child. Moreover, the 
requirements for potential adoptive parents are much more relaxed in the waiting child program. 
Guatemala, long one of the largest sending countries to the United States, in contemplating reopening 
its international adoption program, has made it clear that any such new program will be restricted to 
special needs children. Bulgaria, to give a third example, reopened its international adoption program as 
a special needs program.
10. Elizabeth Bartholet, Permanency Is Not Enough: Children Need the Nurturing Parents Found in International 
Adoption, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 781 (2010–11).
11. See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Nobody’s Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift, 
and the Adoption Alternative (1999); Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption, 
Infertility and the New World of Child Production (1999).
12. Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 553(a)(1), 208 
Stat. 3518, 4506 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1996(b) (2000)).
13. Bartholet, supra note 10, at 783.
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II
 Whitney Reitz is Branch Chief of Programs, International Operations Division, 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). She was a key person in the U.S. government decision, in the wake 
of the devastating earthquake that hit Haiti on January 12, 2010, to use the USCIS 
humanitarian parole program to admit over 1100 Haitian children who were in the 
process of being adopted by American families.14 Her article details the careful way 
USCIS officials vetted each application by potential adoptive parents (PAPs) for 
both suitability of the parents and availability of the child.15 Reitz’s account of the 
equally meticulous work done by various other branches of DHS, such as Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), as 
well as diplomats from the Department of State, U.S. military officers, and officials 
from the Department of Health and Human Services, belies the ill-informed 
criticism of this program popular in some circles.16 As Reitz points out, rather than a 
wholesale baby lift, the Humanitarian Parole Program was narrowly aimed and 
carefully administered; in the end almost one-third of the applications were denied, 
either because the criteria for eligibility were not met or because the documents and 
evidence introduced in some way did not make the grade.
 Reitz was able to help these Haitian children because, in her words, “adoption is 
a form of immigration,” and she is an official in USCIS.17 Her job was a stroke of 
fortune for the Haitian parolees, but the intersection of adoption and immigration 
can also become a great problem for potential adoptive children. The political 
untouchability of immigration reform casts blight on any legislative action that 
involves international adoption because, by definition, it will have an immigration 
nexus. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the tortured path of the Help Haiti 
Act of 2010.18 This legislation was designed to help the Haitian parolees obtain U.S. 
legal permanent residency and eventually citizenship—neither status being conferred 
by humanitarian parole. Because these Haitian children were in the process of being 
adopted into the United States, absent the earthquake they would have received 
citizenship in the normal course of events through the granting of the IR-3 or IR-4 
visas necessary for internationally adopted children whose PAPs are seeking to bring 
14. Secretary Napolitano Announces Humanitarian Parole Policy for Certain Haitian Orphans Fact Sheet, U.S. 




updated Jan. 18, 2010).
15. Whitney A. Reitz, Reflections on the Special Humanitarian Parole Program for Haitian Orphans, 55 N.Y.L. 
Sch. L. Rev. 791 (2010–11).
16. See, e.g., Ginger Thompson, After Haiti Quake, the Chaos of U.S. Adoptions, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 2010, at 
A1. Compounding the egregiousness of this account was the failure of The New York Times to publish 
any letters that pointed out the errors of fact and omissions that characterized this account.
17. See Reitz, supra note 15, at 792. 
18. H.R. Res. 5283, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted); S. Res. 3411, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).
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them to the United States Therefore, the Help Haiti Act was not conferring any 
extra benefits but simply returning these particular children to the legal status they 
would have had but for the earthquake.
 Yet, the Help Haiti Act, rather than reaching President Obama quickly, instead 
became mired in legislative objections to immigration reform as well as worries about 
fraud. Initially, congressional opposition arose largely from fears that the Help Haiti 
Act potentially created another exploitable immigration “loop-hole.” Months passed 
and finally the Help Haiti Act seemed assured of passage in the lame duck session. 
It was again thwarted, this time because pro-immigration politicians tried to link the 
Help Haiti Act with the Dream Act, a bill which would permit certain classes of 
undocumented adults who came to the United States as minors to qualify for 
citizenship. Only the magnitude of the disaster in Haiti and the dedicated drive of 
many people in the public and private sectors allowed the Help Haiti Act to be 
uncoupled from the Dream Act and achieve passage on December 2, 2010.19
 Ironically, “fraud” is also a fighting word for international adoption opponents 
who generally support other aspects of immigration reform. These adversaries are so 
shocked by any hint of fraud that the mere whisper of such a possibility, in their 
view, demands a total program shutdown.20 The subject of fraud will be addressed 
below, but in the context of Reitz’s article it is important to recognize that U.S. 
government officials, working with Haitian counterparts, were able to expeditiously 
and sensitively admit the children who qualified while, with sadness but acting 
properly, excluding children who did not meet the qualifications for the program. 
The successful balancing act demonstrated during the Haitian crisis should not be 
excoriated but rather should become a model for how governments administer 
international adoption programs.
 Reitz also addresses the question of whether international adoption deprives a 
child of his or her authentic culture. This issue, passionately declaimed by critics of 
international adoption, is today a red herring. For children of ethnic minorities and 
special needs adoption, increasingly the focus of international adoption, the choice 
was not between a loving family in their birth country and one in the receiving 
country, but a pitiful, straitened existence in their home country versus a fulfilling 
family life abroad.
 Undeniably, the question of denying a child his or her birth culture may have 
been valid half a century ago when adoptive parents were routinely advised to 
immerse children in their new countries’ customs and leave their past behind. Today, 
the environment of internationally adopted children is radically different. From the 
multi-chaptered adoptive parents’ organizations such as Families for Children from 
China and Families for Russian and Ukrainian Adoption, to heritage adoption trips, 
19. President Obama signed the Help Haiti Act into law on December 9, 2010. Help Haiti Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-293, 124 Stat. 3175.
20. Why is international adoption a field of human endeavor where the best are called upon to destroy the 
good? Doctors are lauded despite malpractice claims and super bugs, highways are built although they 
lead to tragic road accidents, and family law policy focuses on reunification despite the documented 
tragedies that have ensued.
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to sending country-focused assistance charities such as Half the Sky and Love 
without Borders, birth cultures are exalted as never before in the United States. The 
paradigmatic example has switched from the lamentable quotes from 1950s and 
1960s anecdotes, “they told me not to say I came from Asia,” to the families that 
bring their children’s birth country celebrations to schools and social events 
throughout the country.
III
 Our belief that the existence of fraud should not trigger closure of international 
adoption programs makes it more important to provide punitive measures to be taken 
against those who betray the responsibilities of working in the adoption field. While 
the number of children victimized outside of international adoption by sex-traffickers, 
child-servitude employers, and the like far exceeds the number of children stolen, 
bought, or kidnapped for the purpose of adoption, those who work in the field of 
adoption should rightly be held to higher standards than the standards of practice 
applied in commercial law fields.21 The federal nature of our legal system, and the 
division of responsibility between DOS and private sector ASPs, combined with the 
transnational legal questions that arise in international adoption, make finding 
applicable legal remedies to prosecute perpetrators of adoption fraud a far from easy 
task. Imperfect Remedies: The Arsenal of Criminal Statutes Available to Prosecute 
International Adoption Fraud in the United States, by Katie Rasor, Richard M. 
Rothblatt, Elizabeth A. Russo, and Julie A. Turner, provides critical weapons for 
officials who seek to punish guilty adults without damaging the futures of the 
innocent children who were victimized yet again by the adults entrusted with their 
care.22 As Rasor et al. point out, criminal prosecution of international adoption is 
rare.23 Their article provides important tools to remedy this disgraceful fact.
 The authors thoroughly discuss how the IAA might be used to prosecute adoption 
fraud. The suggestion that the IAA be expanded to cover all international adoption 
to the United States, rather than just Hague Adoption Convention adoptions, is a 
key point and one with which we entirely agree. While the authors are correct that 
the ideas they proffer will not “require a significant overhaul of the statute,”24 enacting 
these legislative amendments and the consequent regulatory changes suggested by 
the authors will, if past experience is any guide, be a difficult feat. The tortured 
process of Hague Adoption Convention ratification with its fifteen-year path to 
U.S.-effectiveness illustrates what happens when a niche bill that excites great passion 
21. One example is the Haitian practice of restavec, a French word that translates into “staying with” but is 
really a form of slavery. A moving account of a boy’s f light from restavec can be found in Jean-Robert 
Cadet, Restavec: From Haitian Slave Child to Middle-Class American (1998).
22. Katie Rasor, Richard M. Rothblatt, Elizabeth A. Russo & Julie A. Turner, The Arsenal of Criminal 
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and involves many bureaucracies and interest groups wends its way through the 
legislative and executive process.
 Rasor et al., in the second part of their article, discuss how other statutes might be 
used to prosecute adoption fraud. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Travel Act, 
and “tack-on” criminal statutes all provide avenues for prosecution of dishonest adoption 
professionals. Their analysis first demonstrates the deterrent possibilities presented by 
these statutes. When Karen and Scott Banks and their fellow scam artists who operated 
in American Samoa saw their charges reduced from prison-worthy felonies to probation, 
it gave new meaning to the phrase “slap on the wrist.”25 Just as importantly, the fact 
that these existing statutes can and should be utilized against bad actors in the 
international adoption field will, we hope, separate genuine pro-ethical international 
adoption advocates who advocate country closures out of despair from ideological 
opponents of international adoption who use the existence of fraud to disguise their 
complete rejection of any international adoption per se.
IV
 The discussion of possible prosecutions of adoption fraud malefactors leaves 
unanswered an equally more important question: What should the legal treatment of 
improper adoptions be? Elena Schwieger addresses this exact point.26 The children 
involved have not participated in any adoption fraud themselves; as a community we 
must do as much as possible to ensure that they are not subject to the trauma of 
disruption. The overlapping international, national, and state statutes and regulations 
appear to provide conflicting answers to the question of what the legal treatment and 
practical fate should be of a child who has been fraudulently adopted. Schwieger’s 
exploration of U.S. and international law serves as an excellent basis for discussion. 
The Banks case cited above provides ballast, were any needed, of the relevance of 
this article; worries about the fate of the adopted children living in the United States 
played a role in the disposition of charges against the Banks.
 One of the points that emerge from this article is that the UNRCR, according to 
Schwieger, tilts towards the returning of a child of an “improper adoption” to his or 
her birth country.27 The “other Hague Adoption Convention treaty,” the Hague 
Adoption Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
(HCCH), takes a similar approach.28 The HCCH was completed in 1980; the 
25. Karen and Scott Banks ran Focus on Children, a Utah based adoption agency that deceived Samoan 
birth parents into thinking their children would come to the United States for free education while 
telling U.S. PAPs that these children were available for adoption. The Banks and two employees were 
sentenced to five years probation and banned from working in the adoption field for life. The pain and 
heartache they caused were incalculable. U.S. Couple Sentenced Over Samoan Adoption Scam, ABC News 
(Feb. 27, 2009, 6:07 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/02/27/2503646.htm.
26. See generally Elena Schwieger, Getting to Stay: Clarifying Legal Treatment of Improper Adoptions, 55 N.Y.L. 
Sch. L. Rev. 825 (2010–11).
27. Id. at 828.
28. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 
11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89.
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negotiations that preceded the treaty served as precedent for the Hague Adoption 
Convention.29 As the HCCH pertains to wrongful child snatching by non-custodial 
parents, its bias against international adoptions is understandable. However, that 
does not mean that its approach is the correct one for dealing with adoption cases 
generally.
 By contrast, U.S. statutes, in particular the IAA and related regulations as well 
as the Hague Adoption Convention, as opposed to the UNCRC, tilt in favor of the 
right of the child of a wrongful adoption to stay with his or her adoptive parents in 
the receiving country. Notwithstanding the evolution in human rights laws that we 
have witnessed over the last half century, children still have a restricted arsenal of 
acknowledged rights. Indeed, even the child-centered Hague Adoption Convention 
denigrates children’s rights; terms such as sending country and receiving country 
make a child sound like a package rather than a person. Fortunately, Professors Paulo 
Barrozo and Richard Carlson have addressed these very issues.
V
 Professor Paulo Barrozo has taken a grand approach in Finding Home in the 
World: A Deontological Theory of the Right to Be Adopted.30 The widespread assumption 
that human rights law represents a hallowed tradition of policy formation and 
practice, as well as a legal framework for analysis, is an ahistorical one. As recent 
works of scholarship make clear, the muscular, instrumental view of human rights is 
a new development whose takeoff period can be traced to the Nuremberg trials, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and the Helsinki Accords of 1975.31 
Brick by brick, the stance that a government as a whole and that an individual official 
in particular is free to act against fellow citizens with impunity has been dismantled. 
We are present at the creation of a replacement body of law and unsettled issues 
abound.
 If the invention of human rights law is new, the nature and content of human 
rights laws applying to children is even more unclear. What those of us who view 
international adoption as a vital method of family formation have long needed is a 
definition of human rights that will include and justify “a human right of the 
29. The Office of Children’s Issues in the Department of State is the central authority for both Hague 
Adoption Convention treaties. Our Role, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Children’s Issues, http://
adoption.state.gov/about_us/role.php. That these treaties were drafted under the aegis of the Hague 
Permanent Bureau which is more commonly charged with dealing with commercial issues also explains 
some of the difficulties surrounding logistics of Hague adoptions. 
30. Paulo Barrozo, Finding Home in the World: A Deontological Theory of the Right to be Adopted, 55 N.Y.L.Sch. 
L. Rev. 701 (2010–11).
31. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, known as the Helsinki Final 
Act, Helsinki Accords or Helsinki Declaration, was the final act of the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki, Finland during July and August of 1975. It provided the basis 
for Soviet and other dissidents to mount the campaigns which helped undermine the Soviet Union. See 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (never 
entered into force). 
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unparented to be adopted.”32 Barrozo has supplied both the juridical basis of such a 
right and a method of analysis which transforms our understanding of international 
adoption from the anecdotal and consequentiality adoption case study method to the 
legal and principled level. That children have a right to adoption seems clear; Barrozo 
has demonstrated that it actually is. En route he makes evident the tension between 
the traditional liberal concentration on the rights of an individual versus the current 
“liberal” view which privileges the rights of the group over any one person’s particular 
position. The deadening effect of the latter view on free speech may be seen in the 
revised Dutch penal code, which proscribes punishment for anyone who insults “a 
group of people because of their race.”33 In the realm of international adoption, this 
clash is reflected in the view, expressly or implicitly held, between those who view 
children within the prism of the sending country’s rights and those who judge 
international adoption by how it benefits each single child. The “group” version of 
human rights thinking also propels the belief that international adoption represents 
the victimization of developing world birth mothers by first world child-snatching 
potential adoptive parents and therefore must be stopped, irrespective of the effect 
that would have on the fate of individual children.
VI
 Professor Richard Carlson, in Seeking the Better Interests of Children with a New 
International Law of Adoption,34 provides the practical analysis that complements 
Barrozo’s work. Carlson divides critics of international adoption into three groups: 
(1) vigorous supporters; (2) cynical critics; and (3) moderate critics, and gives us a 
method of examining each of the interest groups within these categories.35 To 
complete his analysis, I would suggest a fourth group: ideological, diehard opponents. 
Individuals representing themselves as well as national and international organizations 
(usually the latter) that fall into this category are among the most intractable 
opponents of international adoption. To say that these true believers are honestly 
convinced of their stance is not necessarily a compliment—to be sincere is not to be 
correct. They believe that international adoption is f lawed ab initio and have used 
international and national organizations to implement and fund their views. 
Opponents who fall into this category include Professor Twila Perry and Baroness 
Emma Nicholson. When Carlson includes these actors in his groups of “cynical 
critics” he does us, and them, a disservice. It is their rigid ideological armor, rather 
than their belief in the prevalence of fraud and corruption, that makes these 
32. Barrozo, supra note 30, at 714.
33. Article 137C of the Dutch penal code states that anyone “who publicly, verbally or in writing or image, 
deliberately expresses himself in any way insulting of a group of people because of their race, their 
religion or belief . . . will be punished with a prison sentence.” Ayaan Hirsi Ali, In Holland, Free Speech 
on Trial, Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870465730457553
9872944767984.html.
34. Carlson, supra note 4.
35. See generally id.
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intractable enemies of international adoption impossible to compromise with or 
confront.36
 Although Carlson is correct that critics of international adoption come to their 
“abolitionist” stance from differing paths,37 they are united in a single goal: ending 
international adoption. Advocates of international adoption, by contrast, often 
seemingly have more disagreements than common ground. The ideological and 
policy variations among the programs of international adoption proponents means 
that international adoption supporters generally offer only scattered resistance to the 
current onslaught against international adoption. Most dramatically, over the last 
two years, with little fanfare, the Obama administration has largely spun off U.S. 
international child welfare policy to UNICEF.38 International adoption supporters 
have so far proved helpless against this takeover.39
 Carlson’s discussion of the number of children who could potentially be adopted 
internationally clarifies another aspect of the debate over international adoption. His 
conclusion is a just one: that the number of children who could benefit from 
international adoption surely exceeds the number of children who are unparented.40 
Carlson also gives important examples of the gaps in adoption statistics and 
parenthetically discusses a crucial element of the anti-international adoption stance: 
international and national welfare groups depend on victims of tragedy for their 
existence. Just as Carlson makes the point that raising the price of international 
adoption will make it a self-fulfilling prophecy of the “stereotype of the wealthy 
Westerner ‘shopping’ for children,”41 lessening the number of children who need to 
be in a non-governmental organization’s (NGO) care will decrease the amount of 
money and staff these NGOs can request.
 Finally, Carlson proposes a reorientation of international law from a focus on the 
best interests of the child to the “better interests” of the child. Surely this is a very 
important restatement. As he says: “Despite what the best interests standard might 
seem to suggest, no court in America upholds the interests of any child without at 
36. Another member of this group is Professor Laura Briggs, whose work is ref lective of this viewpoint par 
excellence. Laura Briggs, Sex, Reproduction and Foreign Policy: From Abu Ghraib to Transnational 
Adoption (Oct. 4, 2004) (unpublished article), available at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lbriggs/adoption.
html. 
37. Carlson, supra note 4, at 756–59.
38. The administration, through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
delegated the Haitian post-earthquake assistance for children to be distributed by UNICEF, which also 
has the responsibility for co-coordinating the billions of dollars of foreign assistance to be given to and 
on behalf of Haitian children in the coming years.
39. Even more discouraging, organizations whose mandate is international adoption increasingly appear to 
be accepting the paradigm used by international adoption opponents. See, e.g., Kathleen Strottman, 
Renewed Promise: The Welfare of Children in Haiti, Cong. Coal. on Adoption Inst. (Jan. 12, 2011), 
http://www.ccainstitute.org/images/stories/renewed_promise_the_welfare_of_children_in_haiti_
jan_12_11.pdf.
40. See generally Carlson, supra note 4.
41. Id. at 771.
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least some regard for the interests of other parties, including parents most of all.”42 
And increasingly, I would add, the interests of nation states and national groups that 
claim the child, irrespective of the particular child’s needs.43 Carlson’s new 
formulation, “promot[ion of] laws and policies that will achieve ‘better’ outcomes for 
children in general,” gives us a new paradigm upon which to build our analysis of the 
law and practice of international adoption.44 Not a moment too soon.
VII
 Several years ago, the Center for Adoption Policy co-sponsored a conference on 
the crisis in international adoption. Since then, the situation has only gotten worse. 
We were privileged to have Ambassador Jerome Shestack, past president of the 
American Bar Association, as one of the attendees. Ambassador Shestack, long a 
warrior in the fight for human rights, is not a habitué of the adoption wars. After 
listening incredulously to many different speakers, he asked “what’s wrong with 
international adoption?” For many years we in Professor Carlson’s community of 
“vigorous supporters” have been posing this same question. Thanks to the excellent 
contributions in this issue, we know what is right about using international adoption 
to save children in crisis, know better how to deal with fraudulent international 
adoptions, and have been given the legal tools to rescue international adoption from 
the fate it seemingly awaits. These articles give an intellectual and legal foundation 
to our hope that the current decline of international adoption represents the trough 
before the crest. A new tradition that would embrace families for as many unparented 
children as possible would be one certainly worth keeping.
42. Id. at 772.
43. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978 ably demonstrates the U.S. adoption law application of 
group rights over individual interests. ICWA, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3269 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 1901–1963 (2006)). 
44. Carlson, supra note 4, at 775.
